# 1NC

## Anthro

#### The affirmative’s purposeful choice of silence on animals maintains the human exploitative gaze towards non-humans ensures that anthropocentrism continues – this is not a question of can they make a bind, but a question of starting points – the 1AC is a starting point that can’t be taken back.

Bell, York University department of education, and Russell, Lakehead University associate professor, 2k (Anne C. and Constance L., department of education, York University, Canada, and Canadian Journal of Environmental Education, “Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn,” CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 25, 3 (2000):188–203, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf, p. 192)

We come to critical pedagogy with a background in environmental thought and education. Of primary concern and interest to us are relationships among humans and the “more-than-human world” (Abram, 1996), the ways in which those relationships are constituted and prescribed in mo- dern industrial society, and the implications and consequences of those constructs. As a number of scholars and nature advocates have argued, the many manifestations of the current environmental crisis (e.g., species extinction, toxic contamination, ozone depletion, topsoil depletion, climate change, acid rain, deforestation) reflect predominant Western concepts of nature, nature cast as mindless matter, a mere resource to be exploited for human gain (Berman, 1981; Evernden, 1985; Merchant, 1980). An ability to respond adequately to the situation therefore rests, at least in part, on a willingness to critique prevailing discourses about nature and to consider alternative representations (Cronon, 1996; Evernden, 1992; Hayles, 1995). To this end, poststructuralist analysis has been and will continue to be invaluable.¶ It would be an all-too-common mistake to construe the task at hand as one of interest only to environmentalists. We believe, rather, that dis- rupting the social scripts that structure and legitimize the human dom- ination of nonhuman nature is fundamental not only to dealing with environmental issues, but also to examining and challenging oppressive social arrangements. The exploitation of nature is not separate from the exploitation of human groups. Ecofeminists and activists for environ- mental justice have shown that forms of domination are often intimately connected and mutually reinforcing (Bullard, 1993; Gaard, 1997; Lahar, 1993; Sturgeon, 1997). Thus, if critical educators wish to resist various oppressions, part of their project must entail calling into question, among other things, the instrumental exploitive gaze through which we humans distance ourselves from the rest of nature (Carlson, 1995).¶ For this reason, the various movements against oppression need to be aware of and supportive of each other. In critical pedagogy, however, the exploration of questions of race, gender, class, and sexuality has proceeded so far with little acknowledgement of the systemic links between human oppressions and the domination of nature. The more-than-human world and human relationships to it have been ignored, as if the suffering and exploitation of other beings and the global ecological crisis were somehow irrelevant. Despite the call for attention to voices historically absent from traditional canons and narratives (Sadovnik, 1995, p. 316), nonhuman beings are shrouded in silence. This silence characterizes even the work of writers who call for a rethinking of all culturally positioned essentialisms.¶ Like other educators influenced by poststructuralism, we agree that there is a need to scrutinize the language we use, the meanings we deploy, and the epistemological frameworks of past eras (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378). To treat social categories as stable and unchanging is to reproduce the prevailing relations of power (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 89). What would it mean, then, for critical pedagogy to extend this investigation and critique to include taken-for-granted understandings of “human,” “animal,” and “nature”?¶ This question is difficult to raise precisely because these understandings are taken for granted. The anthropocentric bias in critical pedagogy man- ifests itself in silence and in the asides of texts. Since it is not a topic of discussion, it can be difficult to situate a critique of it. Following feminist analyses, we find that examples of anthropocentrism, like examples of gender symbolization, occur “in those places where speakers reveal the assumptions they think they do not need to defend, beliefs they expect to share with their audiences” (Harding, 1986, p. 112).¶ Take, for example, Freire’s (1990) statements about the differences between “Man” and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the importance of “naming” the world, he outlines what he assumes to be shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hier- archical dichotomy that establishes human superiority. Humans alone, he reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone are able to infuse the world with their creative presence, to overcome situations that limit them, and thus to demonstrate a “decisive attitude towards the world” (p. 90).¶ Freire (1990, pp. 87–91) represents other animals in terms of their lack of such traits. They are doomed to passively accept the given, their lives “totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but to their species. Thus whereas humans inhabit a “world” which they create and transform and from which they can separate themselves, for animals there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically bound.”¶ To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals only in a nominal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, we as humans are somehow more unique. We have the edge over other crea- tures because we are able to rise above monotonous, species-determined biological existence. Change in the service of human freedom is seen to be our primary agenda. Humans are thus cast as active agents whose very essence is to transform the world – as if somehow acceptance, appreciation, wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale.¶ This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy. The human/animal opposition upon which it rests is taken for granted, its cultural and historical specificity not acknowledged. And therein lies the problem. Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness from its “seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and communities have in setting themselves off from others” (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 91). This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and like other discourses of normalcy, it limits possibilities of taking up and con- fronting inequities (see Britzman, 1995). The primacy of the human enter- prise is simply not questioned.¶ Precisely how an anthropocentric pedagogy might exacerbate the en- vironmental crisis has not received much consideration in the literature of critical pedagogy, especially in North America. Although there may be passing reference to planetary destruction, there is seldom mention of the relationship between education and the domination of nature, let alone any sustained exploration of the links between the domination of nature and other social injustices. Concerns about the nonhuman are relegated to environmental education. And since environmental education, in turn, remains peripheral to the core curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Russell, Bell, & Fawcett, 2000), anthropocentrism passes unchallenged.1¶ p. 190-192

#### The topic is demonstrative of this – their attempt to bind the language of law with the language of war masks the species war at the foundation of the law of war. Their framing of what war is allows for all forms of suffering to continue

Kochi 9

“species war: law, violence, and animals”, 353-359

In everyday speech, in the words of the media, politicians, protestors, soldiers and dissidents, the language of war is linked to and intimately bound up with the language of law. That a war might be said to be legal or illegal, just or unjust, or that an act might be called “war” rather than terror or crime, displays aspects of reference, connection, and constitution in which the social meaning of the concepts we use to talk about and understand war and law are organised in particular ways. The manner in which specific terms (i.e. war, terror, murder, slaughter, and genocide) are defined and their meanings ordered has powerful and bloody consequences for those who feel the force and brunt of these words in the realm of human action. In this paper I argue that the juridical language of war contains a hidden foundation – *species war*. That is, at the foundation of the *Law of war* resides a species war carried out by humans against non-human animals. At first glance such a claim may sound like it has little to do with law and war. In contemporary public debates the “laws of war” are typically understood as referring to the rules set out by the conventions and customs that define the legality of a state’s right to go to war under international law. However, such a perspective is only a narrow and limited view of what constitutes the *Law of war* and of the relationship between law and war more generally. Here the “Law” of the “Law of war” needs to be understood as involving something more than the limited sense of positive law. The Law of war denotes a broader category that includes differing historical senses of positive law as well as various ethical conceptions of justice, right and rights. This distinction is clearer in German than it is in English whereby the term *Recht* denotes a broader ethical and juristic category than that of *Gesetz* which refers more closely to positive or black letter laws.1 To focus upon the broader category of the Law of war is to put specific (positive law) formulations of the laws of war into a historical, conceptual context. The Law of war contains at its heart arguments about and mechanisms for determining what constitutes *legitimate violence*. The question of what constitutes legitimate violence lies at the centre of the relationship between war and law, and, the specific historical laws of war are merely different juridical ways of setting-out (positing) a particular answer to this question. In this respect the Law of war (and thus its particular laws of war) involves a practice of normative thinking and rule making concerned with determining answers to such questions as: what types of coercion, violence and killing may be included within the definition of “war,” who may legitimately use coercion, violence and killing, and for what reasons, under what circumstances and to what extent may particular actors use coercion, violence and killing understood as war? When we consider the relationship between war and law in this broader sense then it is not unreasonable to entertain the suggestion that at the foundation of the Law of war resides species war. At present, the Law of war is dominated by two cultural-conceptual formulations or discourses. The Westphalian system of interstate relations and the system of international human rights law are held to be modern *foundations* of the Law of war. In the West, most people’s conceptions of what constitutes “war” and of what constitutes a “legitimate” act of war are shaped by these two historical traditions. That is to say, these traditions have ordered how we understand the legitimate use of violence.2 These discourses, however, have been heavily criticized. By building upon a particular line of criticism I develop my argument for the foundational significance of species war. Two critiques of sovereignty and humanitarian law are of particular interest: Michel Foucault’s notion of “race war” and Carl Schmitt’s notion of “friend and enemy.” Foucault in *Society Must Be Defended* set out a particular critique of the Westphalian juridical conception of state sovereignty and state power.3 Within the Westphalian juridical conception, it is commonly argued that sovereign power and legitimacy are grounded upon the ability of an institution to bring an end to internal civil war and create a sphere of domestic peace. Against this Foucault claimed that war is never brought to an end within the domestic sphere, rather, it continues and develops in the form of “race war.” Connected to his account of bio-power, Foucault suggests a historical discourse of constant and perpetual race war that underlies legal and political institutions within modernity.4 In *The Concept of the Political*, Carl Schmitt offered a critique of the liberal conception of the state grounded upon the notion of the “social contract” and criticized legal and political conceptions of the state in which legitimacy (and the legitimacy of war) was seen to be grounded upon the notion of “humanity.”5 For Schmitt the juridical notion of the state (and international human rights law) presupposes and continually re-instates through violence the distinction and relation between “friend and enemy.” Schmitt claimed that the political emerges from the threatening and warlike struggle between friends and enemies and that all political and legal institutions, and the decisions made therein, are built upon and are guided by this distinction.6 In relation to the issue of war/law these two insights can be taken further. I think Foucault’s notion of race war can be developed by putting at its heart the differing historical and genealogical relationships between human and non-human animals. Thus, beyond race war what should be considered as a primary category within legal and political theory is that of *species war*. Further, the fundamental political distinction is not as Schmitt would have it, that of friends and enemies, but rather, the violent conflict between human and non-human animals. Race war is an extension of an earlier form of war, species war. The friend-enemy distinction is an extension of a more primary distinction between human and non-human animals. In this respect, what can be seen to lay at the foundation of the Law of war is not the Westphalian notion of civil peace, or the notion of human rights. Neither race war nor the friend-enemy distinction resides at the bottom of the Law of war. Rather, what sits at the foundation of the Law of war is a discourse of species war that over time has become so naturalised within Western legal and political theory that we have almost forgotten about it. Although species war remains largely hidden because it is not seen as war or even violence at all it continues to affect the ways in which juridical mechanisms order the legitimacy of violence. While species war may not be a Western monopoly, in this account I will only examine a Western variant. This variant, however, is one that may well have been imposed upon the rest of the world through colonization and globalization. In what will follow I offer a sketch of species war and show how the juridical mechanisms for determining what constitutes legitimate violence fall back upon the hidden foundation of species war. I try to do this by showing that the various modern juridical mechanisms for determining what counts as legitimate violence are dependent upon a practice of judging the value of forms of life. I argue that contemporary claims about the legitimacy of war are based upon judgements about differential life-value and that these judgements are an extension of an original practice in which the legitimacy of killing is grounded upon the valuation of the human above the non-human. Further, by giving an overview of the ways in which our understanding of the legitimacy of war has changed, I attempt to show how the notion of species war has been continually excluded from the Law of war and of how contemporary historical movements might open a space for its possible re-inclusion. In this sense, the argument I develop here about species war offers a particular way of reflecting upon the nature of *law* more generally. In a Western juridical tradition, two functions of law are often thought to be: the establishment of order (in the context of the preservation of life, or survival); and, the realization of justice (a thick conception of the “good”). Reflecting upon these in light of the notion of species war helps us to consider that at the heart of both of these functions of law resides a practice of making judgements about the life-value of particular “objects.” These objects are, amongst other things: human individuals, groups of humans, non-human animals, plants, transcendent entities and ideas (the “state,” “community,” etc.). For the law, the practice of making judgements about the relative lifevalue of objects is intimately bound-up with the making of decisions about what objects can be killed. Within our Western conception of the law it is difficult to separate the moment of judgement over life-value from the decision over what constitutes “legitimate violence.” Species war sits within this blurred middle-ground between judgement and decision – it points to a moment at the heart of the law where distinctions of value and acts of violence operate as fundamental to the founding or positing of law. The primary violence of species war then takes place not as something after the establishment of a regime of law (i.e., after the establishment of the city, the state, or international law). Rather, the violence of species war occurs at the beginning of law, at its moment of foundation, as a generator, as a motor.7In J.M. Coetzee’s *The Lives of Animals* 8 the protagonist Elizabeth Costello draws a comparison between the everyday slaughter of non-human animals and the genocide of the Jews of Europe during the twentieth century. “In addressing you on the subject of animals,” she continues, “I will pay you the honour of skipping a recital of the horrors of their lives and deaths. Though I have no reason to believe that you have at the forefront of your minds what is being done to animals at this moment in production facilities (I hesitate to call them farms any longer), in abattoirs, in trawlers, in laboratories, all over the world, I will take it that you concede me the rhetorical power to evoke these horrors and bring them home to you with adequate force, and leave it at that, reminding you only that the horrors I here omit are nevertheless at the center of this lecture.”9 A little while later she states: “Let me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, cruelty, and killing which rivals anything that the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing them.” “And to split hairs, to claim that there is no comparison, that Treblinka was so to speak a metaphysical enterprise dedicated to nothing but death and annihilation while the meat industry is ultimately devoted to life (once its victims are dead, after all, it does not burn them to ash or bury them but on the contrary cuts them up and refrigerates and packs them so that they can be consumed in the comfort of our own homes) is as little consolation to those victims as it would have been – pardon the tastelessness of the following – to ask the dead of Treblinka to excuse their killers because their body fat was needed to make soap and their hair to stuff mattresses with.”10 Similar comparisons have been made before.11 Yet, when most of us think about the term “war” very seldom do we bother to think about non-human animals. The term war commonly evokes images of states, armies, grand weapons, battle lines, tactical stand-offs, and maybe even sometimes guerrilla or partisan violence. Surely the keeping of cattle behind barbed wire fences and butchering them in abattoirs does not count as war? Surely not? Why not? What can be seen to be at stake within Elizabeth Costello’s act of posing the modern project of highly efficient breeding and factory slaughtering of non-human animals beside the Holocaust is a concern with the way in which we order or arrange conceptually and socially the legitimacy of violence and killing. In a “Western” philosophical tradition stretching at least from Augustine and Aquinas, through to Descartes and Kant, the ordering of the relationship between violence and legitimacy is such that, predominantly, non-human animals are considered to be without souls, without reason and without a *value* that is typically ascribed to humans. For example, for Augustine, animals, together with plants, are exempted from the religious injunction “Thou shalt not kill.” When considering the question of what forms of killing and violence are legitimate, Augustine placed the killing of non-human animals well inside the framework of religious and moral legitimacy.12

The political is already ceded—investigation of values offer the only hope for radical change in the face of environmental destruction.

#### Best 4

(Steven, professor of philosophy at Texas El Paso, “From Earth Day to Ecological Society” http://www.drstevebest.org/Essays/FromEarthDay.htm, date accessed: 7/27/11

Homo sapiens have embarked on an insane, destructive, and unsustainable path of existence. The human species is driving off a cliff at 100 miles an hour without brakes, and yet people live is if the most urgent issue of the day is Janet Jackson’s “wardrobe malfunction” or who will win American Idol. There is much talk about “national security” but nothing is said about the basis of all security – environmental security. Problems like global warming, desertification, and food and water shortages will wreak havoc throughout the planet. As Homeland Security turns ever-more fascist, environmentalists are vilified as eco-terrorists and legal forms of activism are criminalized under the Patriot Act. While Ashcroft prosecutes activists working to help the planet, corporate eco-terrorists continue to pillage and plunder. Meanwhile, Americans, who make up less than 5% of the world’s population, consume 30% of its resources and produce 25% of total greenhouse gas emissions. Whatever forces striving to save the environment are doing, it is not to ward off corporate and state Pac-men greedily devouring the planet. National environmental organizations such as the Sierra Club are tepid, compromise-based, reform-oriented bureaucracies unable to challenge corporate and state power, and grass-roots forces are not great enough in force and numbers. We are in the midst of a major ecological crisis that stems from a social crisis rooted in corporate power and erosion of democracy. In Greek, the word “crisis” means decision, suggesting that humanity, currently poised at a critical crossroads in its evolution, has crucial decisions and choices to make concerning its existence on the planet. Human identity, values, ethics, worldviews, and mode of social organization need major rethinking and reconstruction. In Chinese, “crisis” means both calamity and opportunity. In a diseased individual, cancer often provides the catalyst for personal growth. As a diseased species, human beings can perish, survive in dystopian futures prefigured by films like Mad Max and Waterworld, or seize their opportunity to learn from egregious errors and rise to far higher levels of social and moral evolution. **The Human Plague** The crisis in human existence is dramatically reflected in the 1996 film, Independence Day. The movie is about hostile aliens with no respect for life; they come to earth to kill its peoples, devour its natural resources, and then move onto other planets in a mad quest to find more fuel for their mega-machines and growth-oriented culture. The film is a veiled projection of our own destructive habits onto monstrous beings from another world. We are the aliens; we are the parasites who live off the death of other life forms; we are the captains of the mega-machines that are sustainable only through violence and ecological destruction. We do to the animals and the earth what the aliens do to human life -- the only difference is, we have no other planet to move on to, and no superheroes to save us. We are trapped in a Dawn of the Dead living nightmare where armies of hideous corpses, people thought long dead and buried, walk again with a will to destroy us. The dead represent all the waste, pollution, and ecological debts accrued to our growth culture that we thought we could walk away from unscathed and never again face. But we are waking up to the fact that the “dead” are storming our neighborhoods, crashing through our doors and windows, and hell-bent on devouring us. In his article entitled “A Plague of Human Proportions,” Mark Lynas frames the crisis this way: “Within the earth's biosphere, a single species has come to dominate virtually all living systems. For the past two centuries this species has been reproducing at bacterial levels, almost as an infectious plague envelops its host. Three hundred thousand new individuals are added to its numbers every day. Its population of bodies now exceeds by a hundred times the biomass of any large animal species that has ever existed on land since the beginning of geological time. The species is us. Now numbering more than six billion souls, the human population has doubled since 1950. Nothing like this has happened before in the earth's history. Even the dinosaurs, which dominated for tens of millions of years, were thinly spread compared to the hairless primate Homo sapiens.” Thus, a single biological type has wreaked havoc on the estimated ten million other species in habiting the planet. Lynas suggests that because Homo sapiens dominates the planet today as dinosaurs did one hundred million years ago, “We are entering a new geological era: the Anthropocene.” According to a March 2004 Earth Policy Institute report, “Humans have transformed nearly half of the planet's ice-free land areas, with serious effects on the rest of nature … Each year the earth's forest cover shrinks by 16 million hectares (40 million acres), with most of the loss occurring in tropical forests, where levels of biodiversity are high … A recent study of 173 species of mammals from around the world showed that their collective geographical ranges have been halved over the past several decades, signifying a loss of breeding and foraging area.” While insipid ideologues like Tibor Machan still publish books such as Putting Humans First: Why we are Nature’s Favorite (2004), it is more accurate to see Homo sapiens as the invasive species and agent of mass extinction par excellence -- not “nature’s favorite” but rather nature’s bete noir.

The proclaims benefits of civil society operation under the ideology of alternative hedonism- the current existence of niche cultures disprove the ability to produce large scale structural changes needed.

Bluhdorn 7/11

[Ingofur, Associate Professor in Politics / Political Sociology at the Department of European Studies at the University of Bath, UK <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2011-07-11-bluhdorn-en.html>, “The Sustainability of Democracy: On limits to growth, the post-democratic turn and reactionary democrats” 2011]

Yet, for all their undeniable achievements, techno-managerial policy approaches have so far been unable to bring about anything like the profound structural transformations that are required if internationalised consumer society is ever to become sustainable. After the fiasco of international climate politics in Copenhagen, after international investment banks were declared too big to fail, and after the oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, it is clear how unambiguously priorities are set. There is little evidence that this will change in any substantial way in the foreseeable future. True to the tradition of the emancipatory social movements, critics of established approaches have been calling for a bottom-up renewal of climate and environmental policy. Claus Leggewie and Harald Welzer, for example, posit that "Only when [...] members of the political community are spoken to as active architects of *their* society, can changes in lifestyle and options for action be realized."[[7]](http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2011-07-11-bluhdorn-en.html" \l "footNoteNUM7) The remodelling of industrial society "will only function", they suggest "if it is posed as a project with which members of society identify. [...] Then it will become a generator of identity rather than a problem of implementation ". The dysfunctional politics of the elites can be corrected only through "'more democracy', in other words innovative forms of direct participation." Similarly, Clive Hamilton asserts that "the climate crisis is upon us because democracy has been corrupted".[[8]](http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2011-07-11-bluhdorn-en.html" \l "footNoteNUM8)The "passivity of the public", he believes, has bred a political class "who stand for little other than self-advancement".[[9]](http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2011-07-11-bluhdorn-en.html" \l "footNoteNUM9) Accordingly, he sees "reclaiming democracy for the citizenry" as the only way to mitigate the effects of climate change and to "ensure that the wealthy and powerful cannot protect their own interests at the expense of the rest". In a manner truly reminiscent of political ecology at the time of the nuclear arms race he urges: "We must democratise survivability"[[10]](http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2011-07-11-bluhdorn-en.html" \l "footNoteNUM10) and adopt "a new radicalism [...] that refuses to be drawn into short-term electoral trade-offs and aims to shift the ground of politics itself".[[11]](http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2011-07-11-bluhdorn-en.html" \l "footNoteNUM11) And in the same vein, Daniel Hausknost insists: "Given the state's inability to initiate radical change, it is down to civil society to mobilise political and social imagination and make genuine alternatives to the current trajectory conceivable and tangible".[[12]](http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2011-07-11-bluhdorn-en.html" \l "footNoteNUM12) For him, too, "the refusal to participate in ecological *governance*-processes", would be a first decisive step towards "de-legitimating the liberal state's politics of simulation" (ibid.) and making authentic progress towards sustainability. Undoubtedly, the radical criticism of de-politicization and expert rule implied in these statements is perfectly justified. The rule of experts is, and has always been, the rule of vested interests, and no structural change to the established order of unsustainability is ever to be expected from those who confine themselves to stimulating ever new cycles of techno-managerial innovation, economic growth and mass consumption. There is also every reason to be concerned about the global elites' determination to buy their way out of the crisis and maintain their lifestyles of unsustainability, whatever the costs for the vulnerable and excluded. And thirdly, the demand for a new radicalism that re-opens a debate on the very principles of liberal consumer capitalism is also fully justified: rising to the challenge of the climate and sustainability crisis does indeed necessitate "thinking about a third industrial revolution in less instrumental terms than the first and the second. Climate change means cultural change – and hence a change in political culture."[[13]](http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2011-07-11-bluhdorn-en.html" \l "footNoteNUM13) Yet assertions that the empowerment of civil society will trigger such a revolution, that more democracy will promote more sustainability, and that at the grass roots of consumer societies an "alternative hedonism"[[14]](http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2011-07-11-bluhdorn-en.html" \l "footNoteNUM14) that might provide the basis for the democratic transition towards sustainability is already emerging, seem idealistic. Alternative niche-cultures certainly exist, and the recent revitalisation of citizen protests in a number of European countries – most notably perhaps the revitalised anti-nuclear movement in Germany – is a beacon of hope. But how much confidence should we have that empowering the democratic citizenry will really move contemporary society closer towards sustainability? What are participatory-democratic approaches able to achieve exactly? More broadly, how are the conditions of contemporary modernity reconfiguring democracy?

#### Anthropocentrism sets up the binary to cause extinction

#### Trenell, 2006

[Paul, September, Department of International Politics, University of Wales, “The (Im)possibility of ‘Environmental Security’”]

It is a relatively recent realisation that human activity over the past two centuries has taken a detrimental toll on the natural environment. The first tentative contentions that the economic modes of production and consumption established by the industrial revolution were exerting a negative impact on the ecosystems which sustain human life were made in the mid twentieth century (Revelle & Suess, 1957). Since then it has become widely acknowledged that human activity is altering the planet‟s climatic make-up. As the science behind environmental degradation grows ever more certain, the security impacts of these developments are constantly unfolding. **Among the ways in which environmental degradation poses direct risks to continued human survival are starvation stemming from reduced crop productivity, disease stemming from increasingly conducive conditions for air and vector borne diseases, and good old fashioned physical destruction stemming from sea level rises and increased storm frequency and intensity**4. Given that “nature is the precondition for everything else” (Dobson, 2006: 175), its ongoing destruction is an extremely disconcerting process, and one that takes on an even more alarming character when it is noted that “the developing world is only just undergoing its industrial revolution” (Brown: 1995: 7).

Before tracing the response to the emergence of environmental hazards it is necessary to say a word about the causes of environmental degradation. By this I refer not to the scientific explanations of the process, but the deeply rooted societal and philosophical developments that have allowed the process to continue. As Simon Dalby has detailed, **environmental threats “are the result of the kind of society that the current global political economy produces**. **Industrial activity, agricultural monocultures, and rampant individual consumption of “disposable items**” (all of which are efforts to enhance some forms of human welfare through domination and control of facets of nature) **produce other forms of insecurity**” (1992a: 113). **A large hand in the development of contemporary environmental problems must be attributed to the enlightenment faith in human ability to know and conquer all. In the quest for superiority and security, an erroneous division between humanity and nature emerged whereby the natural world came to be seen as something to be tamed and conquered rather than something to be respected** (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1973). **Over time, this false dichotomy has become accepted as given, and as a result humankind has lost sight of its own dependence on nature. It is this separation which allows the continued abuse of planetary resources with such disregard for the long-term implications.**

**What is at stake in how we respond to environmental insecurity is the healing of this rift and, in turn, the preservation of human life into the future. Any suggested solutions to environmental vulnerability must account for these concerns and provide a sound basis for redressing the imbalance in the humanity-nature relationship.**

#### The Alternative is to reject the 1AC.

#### Discursive criticism is necessary to challenge the framework of Anthropocentrism- the domination of the non-human world is maintained through discourse and communal meanings.

**Turner 09**

Summer 09 (Rita Turner UMBC: An Honors University in Maryland “The Discursive Construction of Anthropocentrism”. Environmental Ethics; Summer2009, Vol. 31 Issue 2, p183-201, 19p. 2009 EBSCO <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=106&sid=6c27a5b4-37cc-45d1-92e8-1efc915f4205%40sessionmgr110&bdata=JmxvZ2lucGFnZT1sb2dpbi5hc3Amc2l0ZT1laG9zdC1saXZl#db=aph&AN=42988162#db=aph&AN=42988162>)

Our **businesses,** policies, and lifestyles cause unexamined consequences forother people and otherliving beings**, and exact sweeping destruction on the very ecosystems which support all life, including our own**. A major factor contributing to this destructive behavior is the anthropocentric characterof the dominant Western world view,which conceives of the nonhuman living world as apart from and less important than the human world, and which conceptualizes nonhuman nature - including animals, plants, ecological systems, the land, and the atmosphere-as inert**, silent, passive,** and valuable only for its worth as a resource for human consumption. This **anthropocentric conceptual** framework is constructed, transmitted, and reproduced in the realm of discourse, in all of the modes and avenues through which we make and express cultural meaning. We need to make explicit the ways that mainstream Western and American discourse promotes anthropocentrism and masks, denies, or denigrates interdependence, and we need to find ways to reformulate and reframe our discouse if we are to produce the sort of ecological consciousness that will be essential for creating a sustainable future

## Case

#### The executive will circumvent court restrictions.

Thrower 12 (Sharece, Department of Politics @ Princeton University, "The President , the Court, and Policy Implementation," <http://www.princeton.edu/~sthrower/The%20President,%20the%20Court,%20and%20Policy%20Implementation.pdf>)

Based on the assumptions that executive orders are **difficult to challenge in court** and that **justices** generally **defer to the president**, executive orders can be an appealing tool in policymaking, especially when the courts block other channels (Cooper 2002). Specifically, when agency actions are likely to be challenged or struck down, presidents can rely on executive orders to give authority and instruction to agencies, thus bolstering the validity of their actions in court. Thus, the second hypothesis is stated as follows: Executive Order s : **As the president and the courts become more ideologically distant, he issues more executive orders** . Taken together, the Authority - Expanding Hypotheses suggest that presidents often use executive orders as a supplement to rulemaking when attempting to influence policy. When the president is ideologically close to the courts, he can allow more policy implementation to occur through agency rulemaking, with little fear that the rules will be overturned by the courts. Relying on agency rulemaking is preferable to issuing executive orders in this situation because executive orders are costly, as described above. However, when the president is ideologically distant from the courts, he relies less on rulemaking to obtain his preferred outcomes because those rules are more likely to be overturned by an ideologically opposed court. Instead, presidents may choose to rely more heavily on executive orders as an a venue for policy implementation in order to invest the agencies with more authority to act. This makes executive orders an appealing option when the president wishes to avoid litigation. While president s do not wish to use executive orders in every situation, they may serve as a n effective tool to supplement agencies’ authority in many situations where the court is likely to be more hostile towards agency actions.

#### Their act of imagination is useless – they have zero concrete argument for how normative thought is connected to actual law

**SCHLAG IN 1991 (PIERRE, COLORADO LAW PROF. 139 U. PA. L. REV.801, APRIL)**

**One of the consequences of the unquestioned dominance of normative legal thought in the academy is that there has been little or no articulate consideration of just how it is that this thought produces or expects to produce its effects. Yet normative legal thought clearly represents itself as having practical, worldly ambitions. Much normative legal thought reveals an expectation and a desire for its own realization in judicial or statutory law (for formalists) or by effective action in the social sphere (for realists). While this much is clear, what is not clear and indeed has not even [\*844] been seriously questioned, is how normative legal thought expects to realize these ambitions.**

That this question should arise only now is unsurprising. For most of the history of American legal academic thought, it would have been unthinkable to ask such a question. It is only now, when the effectiveness of normative legal thought is in doubt, when the receptivity of judicial (and other) audiences is questionable, n115 when the very identity of any fixed paradigm for legal thought is uncertain, that the question can even arise. Because the question arises seriously for the first time, we are without any strong, self-conscious, widely shared theoretical frameworks to help our inquiry. Still, we are not entirely without markers or resources. If we pay close attention to the normative legal thought that emerges from the academy, we may yet understand how normative legal thought thinks it produces its effects. The more popular normative legal theories, for instance, indirectly reveal a great deal about what normative legal thinkers believe they are doing with their normative legal thought. Instead of reading normative legal theory in terms of what it means for adjudication or "law," we can usefully read these theories for what they reveal about the enterprise of normative legal thought. **Indeed, many of our contemporary jurisprudential theories can easily be seen as instances of projection, where [\*845] authors and readers displace onto the judiciary their own idealized self-images as legal thinkers.**

#### Legal solutions merely mask sovereign power and legitimatize exclusion.

Kohn, 6 -- University of Florida political science assistant professor

[Margaret, "Bare Life and the Limits of the Law," Theory & Event, 9:2, 2006, muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory\_and\_event/v009/9.2kohn.html, accessed 9-12-13, mss]

Giorgio Agamben is best known for his provocative suggestion that the concentration camp – the spatial form of the state of exception - is not exceptional but rather the paradigmatic political space of modernity itself.  When Agamben first made this claim in Homo Sacer (1995), it may have seemed like rhetorical excess. But a decade later in the midst of a permanent war on terror, in which suspects can be tried by military tribunals, incarcerated without trial based on secret evidence, and consigned to extra-territorial penal colonies like Guantanamo Bay, his characterization seems prescient. The concepts of bare life, sovereignty, the ban, and the state of exception, which were introduced in Homo Sacer, have exerted enormous influence on theorists trying to make sense of contemporary politics. Agamben recently published a new book entitled State of Exception that elaborates on some of the core ideas from his earlier work. It is an impressive intellectual history of emergency power as a paradigm of government. The book traces the concept from the Roman notion of iustitium through the infamous Article 48 of the Weimar constitution to the USA Patriot Act. Agamben notes that people interned at Guantanamo Bay are neither recognized as prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention nor as criminals under American law; as such they occupy a zone of indeterminacy, both legally and territorially, which, according to Agamben, could only be compared to the Jews in the Nazi Lager (concentration camps) (4). Agamben's critique of the USA Patriot Act, at least initially seems to bare a certain resemblance to the position taken by ACLU-style liberals in the United States. When he notes that "detainees" in the war on terror are the object of pure de factorule and compares their legal status to that of Holocaust victims, he implicitly invokes a normative stance that is critical of the practice of turning juridical subjects into bare life, e.g. life that is banished to a realm of potential violence. For liberals, "the rule of law" involves judicial oversight, which they identify as one of the most appropriate weapons in the struggle against arbitrary power. Agamben makes it clear, however, that he does not endorse this solution. In order to understand the complex reasons for his rejection of the liberal call for more fairness and universalism we must first carefully reconstruct his argument. State of Exception begins with a brief history of the concept of the state of siege (France), martial law (England), and emergency powers (Germany). Although the terminology and the legal mechanisms differ slightly in each national context, they share an underlying conceptual similarity. The state of exception describes a situation in which a domestic or international crisis becomes the pretext for a suspension of some aspect of the juridical order. For most of the bellicose powers during World War I this involved government by executive decree rather than legislative decision. Alternately, the state of exception often implies a suspension of judicial oversight of civil liberties and the use of summary judgment against civilians by members of the military or executive. Legal scholars have differed about the theoretical and political significance of the state of exception. For some scholars, the state of exception is a legitimate part of positive law because it is based on necessity, which is itself a fundamental source of law. Similar to the individual's claim of self-defense in criminal law, the polity has a right to self-defense when its sovereignty is threatened; according to this position, exercising this right might involve a technical violation of existing statutes (legge) but does so in the name of upholding the juridical order (diritto). The alternative approach, which was explored most thoroughly by Carl Schmitt in his books Political Theology and Dictatorship, emphasizes that declaring the state of exception is the perogative of the sovereign and therefore essentially extra-juridical. For Schmitt, the state of exception always involves the suspension of the law, but it can serve two different purposes. A "commissarial dictatorship" aims at restoring the existing constitution and a "sovereign dictatorship" constitutes a new juridical order. Thus, the state of exception is a violation of law that expresses the more fundamental logic of politics itself. Following Derrida, Agamben calls this force-of-law. What exactly is the force-of-law? Agamben suggests that the appropriate signifier would be force-of-law, a graphic reminder of the fact that the concept emerges out of the suspension of law. He notes that it is a "mystical element, or rather a fictio by means of which law seeks to annex anomie itself." It expresses the fundamental paradox of law: the necessarily imperfect relationship between norm and rule. The state of exception is disturbing because it reveals the force-of-law, the remainder that becomes visible when the application of the norm, and even the norm itself, are suspended. At this point it should be clear that Agamben would be deeply skeptical of the liberal call for more vigorous enforcement of the rule of law as a means of combating cruelties and excesses carried out under emergency powers. His brief history of the state of exception establishes that the phenomenon is a political reality that has proven remarkably resistant to legal limitations. Critics might point out that this descriptive point, even if true, is no reason to jettison the ideal of the rule of law. For Agamben, however, the link between law and exception is more fundamental; it is intrinsic to politics itself. The sovereign power to declare the state of exception and exclude bare life is the same power that invests individuals as worthy of rights. The two are intrinsically linked. The disturbing implication of his argument is that we cannot preserve the things we value in the Western tradition (citizenship, rights, etc.) without preserving the perverse ones. Agamben presents four theses that summarize the results of his genealogical investigation. (1) The state of exception is a space devoid of law. It is not the logical consequence of the state's right to self-defense, nor is it (qua commissarial or sovereign dictatorship) a straightforward attempt to reestablish the norm by violating the law. (2) The space devoid of law has a "decisive strategic relevance" for the juridical order. (3) Acts committed during the state of exception (or in the space of exception) escape all legal definition. (4) The concept of the force-of-law is one of the many fictions, which function to reassert a relationship between law and exception, nomos andanomie. The core of Agamben's critique of liberal legalism is captured powerfully, albeit indirectly, in a quote from Benjamin's eighth thesis on the philosophy of history. According to Benjamin, (t)he tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of exception' in which we live is the rule. We must attain a concept of history that accords with this fact. Then we will clearly see that it is our task to bring about the real state of exception, and this will improve our position in the struggle against fascism. (57) Here Benjamin endorses the strategy of more radical resistance rather than stricter adherence to the law. He recognizes that legalism is an anemic strategy in combating the power of fascism. The problem is that conservative forces had been willing to ruthlessly invoke the state of exception in order to further their agenda while the moderate Weimar center-left was paralyzed; frightened of the militant left and unwilling to act decisively against the authoritarian right, partisans of the rule of law passively acquiesced to their own defeat. Furthermore, the rule of law, by incorporating the necessity of its own dissolution in times of crisis, proved itself an unreliable tool in the struggle against violence. From Agamben's perspective, the civil libertarians' call for uniform application of the law simply denies the nature of law itself. He insists, "From the real state of exception in which we live, it is not possible to return to the state of law. . ." (87) Moreover, **by masking the logic of sovereignty, such an attempt could actually further obscure the zone of indistinction that allows the state of exception to operate.** For Agamben, law serves to legitimize sovereign power. Since sovereign power is fundamentally the power to place people into the category of bare life, the law, in effect, both produces and legitimizes marginality and exclusion.

#### The belief that 9/11 ushered in a “new era” carries with it a host of dangerous assumptions—it legitimates the war on terror and the very civil liberties abuses that the aff indicts

CAROLINE KENNEDY-PIPE AND NICHOLAS RENGGER, 2006 (“Apocalypse now? Continuities or

disjunctions in world politics after 9/11” International Affairs, vol. 82, 3, accessed via EBSCO)

It is now a commonplace of political reflection that the attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001 (to which we will henceforth refer, following common usage, as 9/11), as well as the events that have fl owed from them—the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the US-declared ‘war on terror’, the adoption of an offi cial policy of preventive war by the Bush administration and so on— have reshaped the world politics of the early twenty-fi rst century. Of course, the relative optimism of the early to mid-1990s had already decayed a good deal before 9/11; but since that watershed, it is now often claimed, world politics has taken on a much darker, more apocalyptic hue than at any time in recent history, and this has had profound implications as much for areas such as the global economy and environmental sustainability as for security. Of course, this claim has been expressed in diff erent ways. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, in the preface to their discussion of the 9/11 attacks, have suggested that ‘For years to come, if not decades, the “war on terrorism” will be the defi ning paradigm in the struggle for global order.’1 The contemporary historian John Lewis Gaddis invokes an even more powerful image to emphasize the ‘newness’ and radically transformative character of 9/11, in his meditation on the US experience in its wake: through the days, weeks and months that followed … most of us managed to return to an approximation of normality. And yet our understanding of what is ‘normal’ is not what it once was. Just as New Yorkers go about their familiar activities in the shadow of an unfamiliar skyline, so something within each of us has also changed. It’s as if we were all irradiated, on that morning of September 11 2001, in such a way as to shift our psychological makeup—the DNA in our minds—with consequences that will not become clear for years to come.2 This article seeks to investigate these claims across a range of theoretically disputed areas, and asks whether, how and to what extent the events of the early twentyfi rst century really presage a fundamental, as opposed to merely epiphenomenal, shift in world politics. While some of the topics that we will look at are not staples of theorizing in IR in general or, at least, in the most dominant forms of IR theory, all of them have important implications for IR theory. Moreover, we would argue that ‘theory’ in IR scholarship—indeed in political studies more generally—is best seen as refl ection upon practice, refl ection of various sorts to be sure—philosophical, historical and of other kinds—but nontheless an activity that takes practice in important ways as prior and thus sees theory as parasitic on practice. Briefly put, our argument is—without denying the obvious importance of 9/11 or suggesting simply that ‘the future will be like the past’—that world politics displays far more continuity than change; that 9/11, rather than heralding a new era in world politics, was merely symptomatic of certain key aspects of world politics that should be familiar to all serious students of the field but which, for a variety of reasons, some of which we will briefl y discuss, seem to have been forgotten in the aftermath of the attacks. The one thing that is new, however—and to this we certainly do wish to draw attention—is the belief that there has been a great change in the architecture of world politics. We argue here that this belief is largely a delusion. Nonetheless, it is shared by important elements both in the West and elsewhere, and has created, and is continuing to create, a very dangerous and unstable set of assumptions that, far from delivering security, is generating far greater insecurity than many of the more familiar and traditional assumptions about world politics. In the context of western policy, this belief is manifested chiefl y in the assumptions that have gone to make up the so-called ‘war on terror’—now redefi ned by the Bush administration as ‘the long war’3—and the associated changes in US and wider security and military doctrine. One example of this is the development of what amounts to a preventive war strategy in the US National Security Strategy of 2002.4 However, a more radical and disturbing example can perhaps be found in the changes that seemed to have occurred with regard to traditional western assumptions about the relationship between law and national security under conditions of threat, with the at least partial defence of ‘robust’ interrogation techniques—seen by some as eff ectively legitimating torture—and special facilities where such interrogations take place (for example, the practice of ‘extraordinary rendition’ and the facilities at Abu Ghraib prison and Guantanamo Bay), and the introduction of new legislation which might limit many traditional civil liberties.

#### Hailings of 9/11 are co-opted by conservatives to justify war and imperialism: We should reject appeals to the rhetorical tool of 9/11:

Kalie Gold, 2007 (http://www.watsonblogs.org/matrix/2007/09/from\_kalie\_gold\_should\_we\_forg.html)

Should we forget 9/11? My name is Kalie, I am a senior at Brown University, concentrating in International Relations; I am originally from Washington, DC. I was in DC on 9/11, and still live there. I am taking this class to explore a different way of looking at history—through theoretical frameworks rather than just facts. My first thought is, what is the role of memory? In this case, we should be careful to call it “historical memory.” The complex context surrounding 9/11 pushes us to not just see it as a day of tragedy, but to place it in perspective. Analyzing “tragedy” and truth in the same moment, however, is not an easy task. What an idealistic view. Historical memory is always caught up in complex forces that do not serve a greater good. Historical memory is most often a tool: to define group identity for political purposes, to incite people to action, and to justify means and ends. We have seen 9/11 become this sort of tool. 9/11 left the US with a national feeling of unjust victimization. The idea and feeling of victimization has justified retaliation, and the US took our own violence abroad to Afganistan and Iraq. To forget how the process worked, where it began, and the results, would be wrong. Twenty years from now, the world needs to be able to both learn from our (and others’) mistakes, and appreciate why and from where they came. Does remembering September 11th do us harm? Arguably it already has—regrets about Afganistan, Iraq, and other issues are caught up in the memory of 9/11. Forgetting what happened, and what has happened since, would be a disservice to history.

#### The so called post 9/11 era is merely a fiction—belief in it leads to the manipulation of rhetoric and a time period infected with fear:

University of Leicester, 9/14/2009 (“9/11 has led to a rhetoric - 'Infected with fear'”

<http://www.alphagalileo.org/ViewItem.aspx?ItemId=60969&CultureCode=en>

Eight years on from the 9/11 terrorist attacks, new research from the University of Leicester's Centre for American Studies has examined the impact of the atrocity on language, sense of realism, and how it has led to America's 'current state of fear'. The research, undertaken by Dr Catherine Morley, a lecturer in the School of English at the University of Leicester, reveals that 9/11 not only influenced society's sense of realism and its ability to express this realism, but also let to the manipulation of language, and a rhetoric - 'infected with fear'. She examined different literary responses to the culture of fear and the so-called 'war on terror' looking at how they explore government surveillance, infringement of civil liberties and the role of the media in the new global environment of distrust. As Dr Morley puts it: "In light of this attack on American soil, the first foreign attack since the Second World War, it is not surprising that American writers became more subjective and less dispassionate in their immediate responses, presenting raw personal grief and their perceived sense of the futility of their literary endeavours. There was a general feeling among writers that words would inevitably fail in the face of the extremely visual nature of the attacks. "The events of September 11 engendered a new reality, so close and so familiar it was 'unreal'. When reality becomes a nightmare, realism itself falls apart. And in this context the textual combination of the literary and the visual might come closest to capturing the terrible trauma of 11 September 2001." As writers were called upon to make sense of what the world had witnessed, many commented on the surreal nature of the attacks. Dr Morley explains: "What was immediately striking about a great number of these writers' responses was the emphasis on the visual or on the actual spectacle of the attacks. Many writers described themselves as impotent, as though they were frozen in front of the television screen or, in the case of the New York writers, watching from some city vantage point. "Indeed, for many writers in the weeks and months after the attacks, the heightened visibility of the attacks seemed to render them 'too real'. So the problem for the writer was how to write about events which seemed to defy the logic of traditional narrative realism, and which presented a story that the whole world was already familiar with through an unending televisual loop." Dr Morley's analysis of US government documents finds an 'extraordinarily pervasive rhetoric of fear.' Her research reveals how US military rhetoric and government-fuelled paranoia are conflated within the fiction of the post-9/11 era. The effect, says Morley, is to make a rather deliberate, if subtle, point, which acknowledges the complicity of the West in the propagation of the current state of fear. "It has done so to such an extent that the raised terror alerts which are regularly announced by the global media seem to have engendered a heightened sense of reality, bordering on the surreal in its capacity for inspiring terror." 9/11 fiction continues to be integrated into Dr Morley's courses as she says, "It still feels very relevant and of course all the students remember the atrocity well. They are very interested in it and the effect it has had on society." Literary artists continue to add to the body of comment on what was a terrible historical event. And their reactions, embodied in the fictions produced after 9/11, continue to challenge perceptions and provoke new discussion, eight years on.

# 2NC

#### Changing the way we conceive our relationship to nature is critical to revealing the social construction of bodies within discourses of oppression

Bell, York University department of education, and Russell, Lakehead University associate professor, 2k (Anne C. and Constance L., department of education, York University, Canada, and Canadian Journal of Environmental Education, “Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn,” CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 25, 3 (2000):188–203, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf, p. 198-99)

So far, however, such queries in critical pedagogy have been limited by their neglect of the ecological contexts of which students are a part and of relationships extending beyond the human sphere. The gravity of this oversight is brought sharply into focus by writers interested in environ- mental thought, particularly in the cultural and historical dimensions of the environmental crisis. For example, Nelson (1993) contends that our ina- bility to acknowledge our human embeddedness in nature results in our failure to understand what sustains us. We become inattentive to our very real dependence on others and to the ways our actions affect them. Educators, therefore, would do well to draw on the literature of environ- mental thought in order to come to grips with the misguided sense of independence, premised on freedom from nature, that informs such no- tions as “empowerment.”¶ Further, calls for educational practices situated in the life-worlds of students go hand in hand with critiques of disembodied approaches to education. In both cases, critical pedagogy challenges the liberal notion of education whose sole aim is the development of the individual, rational mind (Giroux, 1991, p. 24; McKenna, 1991, p. 121; Shapiro, 1994). Theorists draw attention to the importance of nonverbal discourse (e.g., Lewis & Simon, 1986, p. 465) and to the somatic character of learning (e.g., Shapiro, 1994, p. 67), both overshadowed by the intellectual authority long granted to rationality and science (Giroux, 1995; Peters, 1995; S. Taylor, 1991). Describing an “emerging discourse of the body” that looks at how bodies are represented and inserted into the social order, S. Taylor (1991) cites as examples the work of Peter McLaren, Michelle Fine, and Philip Corrigan.¶ A complementary vein of enquiry is being pursued by environmental researchers and educators critical of the privileging of science and abstract thinking in education. They understand learning to be mediated not only through our minds but also through our bodies. Seeking to acknowledge and create space for sensual, emotional, tacit, and communal knowledge, they advocate approaches to education grounded in, for example, nature experience and environmental practice (Bell, 1997; Brody, 1997; Weston, 1996). Thus, whereas both critical pedagogy and environmental education offer a critique of disembodied thought, one draws attention to the ways in which the body is situated in culture (Shapiro, 1994) and to “the social construction of bodies as they are constituted within discourses of race, class, gender, age and other forms of oppression” (S. Taylor, 1991, p. 61). The other emphasizes and celebrates our embodied relatedness to the more-than-human world and to the myriad life forms of which it is comprised (Payne, 1997; Russell & Bell, 1996). Given their different foci, each stream of enquiry stands to be enriched by a sharing of insights.¶ Finally, with regard to the poststructuralist turn in educational theory, ongoing investigations stand to greatly enhance a revisioning of environ- mental education. A growing number of environmental educators question the empirical-analytical tradition and its focus on technical and behavioural aspects of curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Robottom, 1991). Advocating more interpretive, critical approaches, these educators contest the discursive frameworks (e.g., positivism, empiricism, rationalism) that mask the values, beliefs, and assumptions underlying information, and thus the cultural and political dimensions of the problems being considered (A. Gough, 1997; Huckle, 1999; Lousley, 1999). Teaching about ecological processes and environmental hazards in a supposedly objective and rational manner is understood to belie the fact that knowledge is socially constructed and therefore partial (A. Gough, 1997; Robertson, 1994; Robottom, 1991; Stevenson, 1993).

**All species have intrinsic value**

**Shepard 3**

Florence Shepard. DEEP ECOLOGY FOR TIlE 21 ST CENTURY, 2003 [h ttp :/lwww . newd imensions .org/on 1 ine-j ournal/artic les/deep-eco logyhtm 1]

**The diverse voices of leading ecologists and activists inspire us to renew our efforts to bring ecological harmony to Planet Earth.** They bring us hope that though direct involvement in our own bioregions, at the same time staying abreast of world-wide problems, we can help turn around the global ecological disasters that seem imminent. Although unique, each viewpoint shares the common, ethical tenets of deep ecology: **The community of companions on Planet Earth is egalitarian, they tell us. The lives of all creatures are of intrinsic value. The quality of life on earth for all species depends on mindful, tempered actions by humans, the dominant organism interdependently joined to all others and to the air, water, and terrain**. Deep Ecology is not a political or economic ideology yet it affects all of our actions and decisions, it is a spiritual**, egalitarian orientation to life on Earth that can and must be embraced by all peoples of all beliefs, if we are to turn the tide of human population growth and massive habitat and species destruction on Planet Earth. There is really no other way out of the crisis we face. It is a matter of conscience, ethics, and action. Although we must act locally, we must look beyond our own gardens and recycling bins.** For Kirkpatrick Sale this means moving from an individualistic to a community orientation. With their deconstruction of so-called “free-trade,” Jerry Mander and Helena Norberg-1-lodge explain how global commerce is destroying local economies and cultures. Sessions suggests that changes will require radical alterations in our life iyies and must include action at the personal and local level as well as thoughtful involvement in global issues.

**This means if we win a link, they lose - The debate is not a question of whether or not they benefit people – it’s about whether or not the 1AC violates the intrinsic value of human and non-human animals**

Eric **Katz**, Director of Science, Technology, and Society Program at the New Jersey Institute of Technology, **1997**

[*Nature as Subject* p. 9-10]

**Utilitarianism** might be salvaged for use in the environmental debate if it is stripped of its bias towards the satisfaction of human needs and preferences. Bentham, it should be remembered, considered the pains and pleasures of the animal kingdom to be of important, a utilitarian calculation. According to this kind of position, the needs and desires of the wildlife in a given area would have to be considered prior to any development or destruction for the purpose of human betterment **Unfortunately**, the problems with this kind of broad utilitarianism appear **insurmountable**. How does the satisfaction of **animal** needs compare in utility with the satisfaction of **human** needs? Can we bring plant life into the calculation? What about nonliving entities, such as rock formations (e.g., the Grand Canyon) or entire ecological areas? Does a marsh have an interest in not being drained and turned into a golf course, a need or desire to continue a natural existence? It is clear that difficult--if not impossible--problems arise when we begin to consider utility for nonhuman and nonsentient entities. A second alternative, highly tentative, is a movement away from a "want-oriented perspective" in ethical theory. Rather than evaluat­ing the moral worth of an action by the **consequences** which satisfy needs and desires in the humyn (or even nonhumyn) world, we can look at the **intrinsic** qualities of the action, and determine what kind of **values** this action manifests. The question which the debate over environmental preservation raises is *not* "Does preservation of this par­ticular natural object lead to a better world?" but rather "'Do we **want a world** in which the preservation of natural objects is considered an important **value**?" The question is **not** whether the preservation of a certain entity increases the amount of satisfaction and **pleasure** in the world, but rather, whether these pleasures, satisfactions, and needs ought to be pursued. The question, in short, is about what kind of **moral universe** **ought to be created**. Only when the preservation of natural objects is seen to be an **intrinsically** good policy of action, rather than a means to some kind of **satisfaction**, will a policy of environmental protection be explained and justified. The development of an ethical theory which can accomplish this task will be a difficult undertaking, but it is the only choice open to preservationists.

#### We control root cause – their impacts are just the extension of anthropocentric logic

Kochi, Queen's University School of Law lecturer, and Ordan, linguist, 08 (Tarik and Noam, Borderlands Volume 7 Number 3, 2008, "An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity,")

When taking a wider view of history, one which focuses on the relationship of humans towards other species, it becomes clear that the human heritage – and the propagation of itself as a thing of value – has occurred on the back of seemingly endless acts of violence, destruction, killing and genocide. While this cannot be verified, perhaps ‘human’ history and progress begins with the genocide of the Neanderthals and never loses a step thereafter. It only takes a short glimpse at the list of all the sufferings caused by humanity for one to begin to question whether this species deserves to continue into the future. The list of human-made disasters is ever-growing after all: suffering caused to animals in the name of science or human health, not to mention the cosmetic, food and textile industries; damage to the environment by polluting the earth and its stratosphere; deforesting and overuse of natural resources; and of course, inflicting suffering on fellow human beings all over the globe, from killing to economic exploitation to abusing minorities, individually and collectively.

#### This is an independent link – human superiority is socially constructed and not factually accurate – viewing every being as significant allows for a radical change in the way we give meaning to the world

Bell, York University department of education, and Russell, Lakehead University associate professor, 2k (Anne C. and Constance L., department of education, York University, Canada, and Canadian Journal of Environmental Education, “Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn,” CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 25, 3 (2000):188–203, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf, p. 195-97)

The human/nature dichotomy is not a frame of reference common to all cultures, and although it prevails today in Western societies, even here there are and always have been alternative ways of understanding and giving expression to a more-than-human world. These can be found, for example, in myth (Kane, 1994, p. 14), poetic expression, certain branches of philosophy and environmental thought, natural history, and children’s literature and films (Wilson, 1991, pp. 128–139, 154).¶ Even within the natural sciences, voices attest to the meaningful exist- ence of nonhuman beings as subjects (McVay, 1993). In animal behaviour research, for instance, numerous studies have challenged the assertion of human superiority based on a narrow definition of language that excludes nonhuman communication. Chimpanzee Washoe and orangutan Chantek use American Sign Language, and other primates, like bonobo Kanzi, are fluent in symbolic language, thereby altering the boundaries commonly drawn between language and mere communication (Gardner, Gardner, & Canfort, 1989; Miles, 1994; Savage-Rumbaugh, Shanker, & Taylor, 1998). And though the bilingual great apes may exhibit language patterns the most similar to those of humans, there are many examples of sophisticated communication in other animals, including mammals, birds, and insects (Griffin, 1992).¶ Meeting the criteria of language implies, of course, that these studies compare and judge other animals against a human yardstick. In other words, a hierarchical divide is still assumed, although its position may shift somewhat to include, on humanity’s side, some of the “higher” animals.¶ For a more radical reframing, one that seeks to acknowledge all life forms as subjects of significance, let us turn to the work of philosopher David Abram. Drawing from phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Abram (1996) argues that all sensing bodies are active, open forms con- stantly adjusting to a world that is itself continually shifting (p. 49). To demonstrate how all beings incessantly improvise their relations to other things he describes the spontaneous creativity of a spider:¶ Consider a spider weaving its web, for instance, and the assumption still held by many scientists that the behavior of such a diminutive creature is thoroughly “programmed in its genes.” Certainly, the spider has received a rich genetic in- heritance from its parents and predecessors. Whatever “instructions,” however, are enfolded within the living genome, they can hardly predict the specifics of the microterrain within which the spider may find itself at any particular moment. They could hardly have determined in advance the exact distances between the cave wall and the branch that the spider is now employing as an anchorage point for her current web, or the exact strength of the monsoon rains that make web-spinning a bit more difficult on this evening. And so the genome could not explicitly have commanded the order of every flexion and extension of her various limbs as she weaves this web into its place. However complex are the inherited “programs,” patterns, or predispositions, they must still be adapted to the immediate situation in which the spider finds itself. However determinate one’s genetic inheritance, it must still, as it were, be woven into the present, an activity that necessarily involves both a receptivity to the specific shapes and textures of that present and a spon- taneous creativity in adjusting oneself (and one’s inheritance) to those contours. (Abram, 1996, p. 50)¶ An equally illuminating insect story, intended to evoke, once again, the subjective world of a nonhuman being, is found in Evernden’s The Natural Alien (1985, pp. 79–80). Borrowing from the work of biologist Jakob von Uexkull, Evernden invites readers “to imagine that we are walking through a meadow and that we discern ‘a soap bubble around each creature to represent its own world, filled with the perceptions which it alone knows’ ” (p. 79). He then attempts to describe what might be the world of a wood tick. The wood tick, he explains, is literally and figuratively blind to the world as we know it. What we readily perceive about our environment would be unknown, unknowable, and irrelevant to her. Her world is composed of three elements: light, sweat, and heat. These are all that she needs to complete her life cycle. Light will lead her to the top of a bush, where she will cling (for as long as 18 years!) until the smell of sweat alerts her to a passing animal. She will then drop, and if she lands on a warm animal, she will indulge in a blood meal, fall to the ground, lay her eggs, and die.¶ Like Abram, Evernden (1985) challenges commonplace, mechanistic assumptions that reduce other life forms to programmed automatons and intimates instead a meaningful life-world completely unlike and outside our own:¶ To speak of reflexes and instincts is to obscure the essential point that the tick’s world is a world, every bit as valid and adequate as our own. There is a subject, and like all subjects it has its world . . . The tick is able to occupy a world that is per- ceptually meaningful to it. Out of the thousands or millions of kinds of information that might be had, the tick sees only what is of significance to it. The world is tailored to the animal; they are entirely complementary . . . This is quite a different view of existence from our usual one in which the animal is simply an exploiter of certain natural resources. We are not talking just about observable interactions between subjects and objects but rather about a very complete interrelation of self and world, so complete that the world could serve as a definition of the self. Without the tick there is no tick-world, no tick-space, no tick-time, – no tick-reality. (pp. 80–81)¶ Evernden’s remarks are significant for the possibilities they open up in our understanding both of the nonhuman and of ourselves. On one hand, they contest the limited notion that awareness is a specifically human attribute. On the other, they remind us that we humans too have bodies that respond to light, sweat, and heat; we too know the world through our bodies in a way that is not entirely dependent upon language; and this bodily knowledge plays an important role in defining our world and giving meaning to it.

### AT- Disease Turns

**Should not use animals for research — testing on humans solves disease better, and is no more morally reprehensible**

Godel 97

[Kelly Godel, writer for the Animal Liberation Front, 1997 [The evasive tactics and deceptive arguments of animal research proponents.

<http://’w> ww.animalliberationfront.com/Saints/Stories/how to vivisect vivisectors.htrnJ ]

“Anthropocentric Myopia.” That is, the glycol and practical arguments they use in an tempt touts’ the harm caused to animals, fail to address and counter the effects these very same arguments would have if applied fairly and equally to humans. It is this oversight which poses the greatest challenge to the animal research defense, and the greatest opportunity for the animal activist. Anthropocentrism and the myth of human superiority will be addressed in more detail later on, however it is worthwhile to remember its importance as we examine the following pro-vivisection arguments**. Anthropocentric Myopia: By stating that medical research is of the utmost importance the animal research proponent is faced with answering this dilemma: Why not use other humans, either volunteers(**offered substantial financial benefits to themselves and families) **or criminals for medical experiments since the results would presumably be faster and safer than using non-human subjects** who differ in physiolo!y from the human patients**? If the goal is to find cures for diseases, and Wit is of the utmost importance. would not the best course of action be an obligation? Most vivisections would quickly respond with alarm or disgust. answering that they would never use other humans even if they could cure cancer by experimenting upon one human test subject. This betrays their argument that medical research is of the utmost importance**.

# 1NR

#### Outweighs the case – Continued militarism guarantees global destruction.

Kevin Clements, President of the International Peace Research Association, Director of the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason, April 3, 1996, Toda Institute Seminar, “The Future of Peace and Conflict Studies,” http://www.toda.org/Default.aspx?PageID=39

What I am suggesting by all of this is that peace and conflict studies in the past have been overwhelmingly biased by sets of Western middle class concerns. (I could also add white, male, reformist concerns.) This is not of itself a bad thing since it did result in the evolutionary of a new interdisciplinary field albeit around a rather narrow range of critical problems, e.g., analysis of the conditions for negative peace (or the absence of war and direct violence) or positive peace (the elimination of structural violence and the promotion of social and economic justice and fairness.) Both of these preoccupations, i.e., the causes of war and violence and the conditions for peace and justice remain at the heart of peace and conflict studies but they need to be broadened if we are to make a significant contribution to the survival of the species and if we are to develop a deepened enhancement of the quality of life for all peoples. So how do we wish to do this? In the first place we must build on the traditions that have been established in the field in order to eliminate militarism, national and global violent conflict and the threat of global destruction. In relation to nuclear weapons, for example, although the risk of nuclear confrontation has diminished considerably, there is continuing anxiety about the command and control of such weapons in Russia and far too many states that wish to cross the nuclear threshold to enhance their international bargaining power, e. g., Pakistan, India, Iran, and Iraq, etc. Generally, however, as the recently formed Canberra Commission notes, this is an opportune time to push for the total abolition of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction. They have no military utility and are increasingly seen as a political liability as well.

#### (--) Military interventions turns the case—it feeds a crisis mentality that prevents solutions to underlying rights violations:

Karen Engle, 2007 (Professor in Law @ University of Texas). “"Calling in the Troops": The Uneasy Relationship Among Women's Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring 2007. Accessed Sept. 9, 2010, Lexis Academic Universe

I am critical of this emerging consensus because I am uneasy with the idea that destroying life and infrastructure is a way to demonstrate concern for a particular place or situation, especially when most of history has shown that such intervention--regardless of motivation--rarely improves the lives of the individuals who are the stated subjects of intervention. More importantly for this Article, I object to the way that calls for military intervention feed into a crisis mentality. As military intervention increasingly becomes the norm for protecting victims of "serious" human rights violations, those who seek to redress a particular problem are increasingly pressured to couch it in terms of a crisis that only immediate military intervention can resolve. This focus often distorts the nature of the violation or harm and displaces an awareness of the extent to which both military and nonmilitary interventions--such as colonialism, economic and military assistance, and lack of such assistance--have helped produce the crises. International law itself has condoned, if not facilitated, such crisis-generating interventions. n3

Our criticism comes before the aff – it doesn’t matter if you’re critiquing the response to the event if you aren’t attentive to the naming of it

**Derrida 2003** interviewed in Philosophy in a time of terror by Giovanna Borradori – Online excerpt http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/066649.html

I believe always in the necessity of being attentive first of all to this phenomenon of language, naming, and dating, to this repetition compulsion (at once rhetorical, magical, and poetic). To what this compulsion signifies, translates, or betrays. Not in order to isolate ourselves in language, as people in too much of a rush would like us to believe, but on the contrary, in order to try to understand what is going on precisely beyond language and what is pushing us to repeat endlessly and without knowing what we are talking about, precisely there where language and the concept come up against their limits: "September 11, September 11, *le 11 septembre,* 9/11."

**The naming of 9/11 is a dangerous act – it presupposes a supposedly universal calendar – the affirmative’s repetition is an attempt at neutralizing and distancing ourselves from the text of that day – turns case by making us powerless to get beyond the significance of the date.**

**Derrida 2003** interviewed in Philosophy in a time of terror by Giovanna Borradori – Online excerpt http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/066649.html

**Derrida:** Le 11 septembre, as you say, or, since we have agreed to speak two languages, "September 11." We will have to return later to this question of language. As well as to this act of naming: a date and nothing more. When you say "September 11" you are already citing, are you not? You are inviting me to speak here by recalling, as if in quotation marks, a date or a dating that has taken over our public space and our private lives for five weeks now. Something *fait date,* I would say in a French idiom, something marks a date, a date in history; that is always what's most striking, the very impact of what is at least felt*,* in an apparently immediate way, to be an event that truly marks, that truly makes its mark, a singular and, as they say here, "unprecedented" event. I say "apparently immediate" because this "feeling" is actually less spontaneous than it appears: it is to a large extent conditioned, constituted, if not actually constructed, circulated at any rate through the media by means of a prodigious techno-socio-political machine. "To mark a date in history" presupposes, in any case, that "something" comes or happens for the first and last time, "something" that we do not yet really know how to identify, determine, recognize, or analyze but that should remain from here on in unforgettable: an ineffaceable event in the shared archive of a universal calendar, that is, a supposedly universal calendar, for these are—and I want to insist on this at the outset—only suppositions and presuppositions. Unrefined and dogmatic, or else carefully considered, organized, calculated, strategic—or all of these at once. For the index pointing toward this date, the bare act, the minimal deictic, the minimalist aim of this dating, also marks something else. Namely, the fact that we perhaps have no concept and no meaning available to us to name in any other way this "thing" that has just happened, this supposed "event." An act of "international terrorism," for example, and we will return to this, is anything but a rigorous concept that would help us grasp the singularity of what we will be trying to discuss. "Something" took place, we have the feeling of not having seen it coming, and certain consequences undeniably follow upon the "thing." But this very thing, the place and meaning of this "event," remains ineffable, like an intuition without concept, like a unicity with no generality on the horizon or with no horizon at all, out of range for a language that admits its powerlessness and so is reduced to pronouncing mechanically a date, repeating it endlessly, as a kind of ritual incantation, a conjuring poem, a journalistic litany or rhetorical refrain that admits to not knowing what it's talking about. We do not in fact know what we are saying or naming in this way: September 11, *le 11 septembre,* September 11. The brevity of the appellation (September 11, 9/11) stems not only from an economic or rhetorical necessity. The telegram of this metonymy—a name, a number—points out the unqualifiable by recognizing that we do not recognize or even cognize that we do not yet know how to qualify, that we do not know what we are talking about.

This is the first, indisputable effect of what occurred (whether it was calculated, well calculated, or not), precisely on September 11, not far from here: we repeat this, *we must* repeat it, and it is all the more necessary to repeat it insofar as we do not really know what is being named in this way, as if to exorcise two times at one go: on the one hand, to conjure away, as if by magic, the "thing" itself, the fear or the terror it inspires (for repetition always protects by neutralizing, deadening, distancing a traumatism, and this is true for the repetition of the televised images we will speak of later), and, on the other hand, to deny, as close as possible to this act of language and this enunciation, our powerlessness to name in an appropriate fashion, to characterize, to think the thing in question, to get beyond the mere deictic of the date: something terrible took place on September 11, and in the end we don't know what. For however outraged we might be at the violence, however much we might genuinely deplore—as I do, along with everyone else—the number of dead, no one will really be convinced that this is, in the end, what it's all about. I will come back to this later; for the moment we are simply preparing ourselves to say something about it.

#### Memories of 9/11 perpetuate further violence—we shouldn’t use this as a benchmark reference point--

Marta da Silva, September 18, 2007(http://www.watsonblogs.org/matrix/2007/09/how\_do\_we\_get\_past\_911\_should.html)

How do we get past 911? Should we forget 911?

Upon receiving this assignment and processing this question, I reasoned that the dilemma in dealing with the tragic events of 911 is an issue of the perception and obligation of commemoration. People need to (yet often do not) separate living in the past and learning from the past. Instead of moving forward in aims of peace, memories of violence and the perception of the events on 911 perpetuate further violence; in a primitive sense, the reaction is comparable to schoolyard, or playground revenge. Violence becomes synonymous with action and justified as such, upholding a sense of duty to remember and fight for the victims of the terrorist attacks. An article from the New York Times on September 11th illustrated the prevailing question of “whether the war in Iraq has made the United States safer or more vulnerable to terrorists.” I would even argue that another question prevails: whether the war in Iraq has made the United States more similar to the terrorists. There is a disturbing video online (http://www.current.tv/pods/controversy/PD04399) that demonstrates a torture technique called “water-boarding,” which is one of the methods used against terrorist suspects. The video at one point states that the aim is for torture to prevent terrorism. Which is worse? Does putting a government label on these methods of violence make them logical or acceptable? Does not this method of resolution simply perpetuate the problem? Likewise, are we better off constantly using 911 as our benchmark reference point, or should we move on? Illustrated by the reading from Theories of International Relations, analyses such as that of Maja Zehfuss contend that the “White House has exploited the memory of ‘September 11’ to justify the curtailment of civil liberties at home, and an aggressive military response abroad,” (167). The politics of memory, as argued by postmodernists, has become a powerful tool in policy decision-making. People must be aware of policy actions and their affiliated interpretations; we must differentiate between honoring the victims and creating some semblance of peace in their memory. A time must come when we can remember and honor the tragedies of 911 without relying on that memory to justify current policies of vengeance and violence. We must commemorate the victims without becoming blinded by the remorse.

#### Their AFF justifies continued over-reactions to 9-11—9/11 has justified a vast military and intelligence build-up that crushes individual freedoms while expanding the state

Fareed Zakaria, 2010 (http://www.newsweek.com/2010/09/04/zakaria-why-america-overreacted-to-9-11.html What America Has Lost)

**The error this time is more damaging.** September 11 was a shock to the American psyche and the American system. As a result, we overreacted. **In a crucially important Washington Post reporting project, “Top Secret America,” Dana Priest and William Arkin spent two years gathering information on how 9/11 has really changed America. Here are some of the highlights.** Since September 11**, 2001,** the U.S. government has created or reconfigured at least 263 organizations to tackle some aspect of the war on terror.The amount of money spent on intelligence has risen by 250 percent**, to $75 billion (and that’s the public number, which is a gross underestimate).** That’s more than the rest of the world spends put together**. Thirty-three new building complexes have been built for intelligence bureaucracies alone, occupying 17 million square feet—the equivalent of 22 U.S. Capitols or three Pentagons. Five miles southeast of the White House, the largest government site in 50 years is being built—at a cost of $3.4 billion—to house the largest bureaucracy after the Pentagon and the Department of Veterans Affairs: the Department of Homeland Security, which has a workforce of 230,000 people. This new system produces 50,000 reports a year—136 a day!—which of course means few ever get read. Those senior officials who have read them describe most as banal; one tells me, “Many could be produced in an hour using Google.” Fifty-one separate bureaucracies operating in 15 states track the flow of money to and from terrorist organizations, with little information-sharing.** Some 30,000 people are now employed exclusively to listen in on phone conversations and other communications in the United States**. And yet no one in Army intelligence noticed that Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan had been making a series of strange threats at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, where he trained. The father of the Nigerian “Christmas bomber” reported his son’s radicalism to the U.S. Embassy. But that message never made its way to the right people in this vast security apparatus. The plot was foiled only by the bomber’s own incompetence and some alert passengers.**